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The aim of this paper is to investigate the economic aspects of CBRN threats. For this 
purpose, the extent to which this topic is reflected in freely-accessible academic literature and 
the costs associated with such threats will be assessed. Furthermore, it is to be determined 
which industries have a particular interest in security against such CBRN threats. 
The publicly accessible literature regarding CBRN terrorism is limited and does not provide a 
homogeneous database; therefore, the information found varies widely. This is due to the fact 
that completely different assumptions are used in terms of methodology and standards 
applied. In addition, the results differ both in the dimensions of the incidents under 
consideration and in the comprehensiveness of the areas of economic impact for which are 
accounted. This applies not only to studies of hypothetical scenarios, but also to historic 
events and easily accountable units, like the number of casualties. For the Bhopal accident, 
the number of casualties is estimated, by different studies, to be between 2,500 and 17,500. In 
case of Chernobyl, the expected number of early cancer fatalities ranges from 1,200 to 
75,000.  
Nuclear threat scenarios are separated here from the area of the other three hazardous 
substances. Although huge mortality figures (736,000 to 8,660,000 in Ramana (1999)) or 
large economic losses (DM 63 – 93 b per year (€ 182 – 271 b per year) in Reich (1971)) are 
estimated, this involves war scenarios, which are not easily compared with acts of terrorism.  
In the course of this study, it became clear that studies in connection with biological incidents 
carry the largest monetary figures. For example, in the Katarisk study, the assumed possible 
direct damage from a biological disaster with CHF 2,010 million/year is 10 to 20 times 
greater than the expected amount of loss for both chemical and radiological incidents. In the 
cases of indirect damage, biological incidents take first place in McKibbin (2006), with an 
estimate of 4.4 trillion USD (11% of the global GDP) for pandemic influenza. Likewise in the 
area of prevention and protection, there is not only the most data, but also the highest amounts 
for biological threats. 
The financial resources that are used for counter-measures against terrorist attacks also exhibit 
huge differences. In this area there was often an overlap with goals not related to the 
prevention of or the protection against CBRN terror, in particular regarding an increase of 
general security in the chemical industry. For some activities, CBRN terror is only a minor 
aspect, for instance the major objective of the destruction of chemical weapons is 
disarmament, but at the same time this investment prevents access of chemical weapons to 
terrorists. 
In general, the total impact costs of large incidents are very high, and are much higher that 
that of counter-measures. For biological threats, the indirect economic impact is assessed to 
be in the range of several billion to tens of billions of US dollars. The countermeasure cost 
range is much lower, ranging from hundreds of millions to about 10 billion USD. Taking the 
bio defence programmes alone, a few hundred thousand to tens of millions are spent by 
European countries for a reference year, while the USA invests about 200 million euros. 
Regarding the investigation of self-interest in security, direct questioning proved to be of 
limited use, as was expected. Further investigations of the security requirements of industries 
were carried out indirectly via third parties, who work within the context of risk prevention. It 
was found that primarily industries with a high symbolic value, as well as those representing ii 
numerous potentially threatened people, regard themselves at risk of attack and thus exhibit a 
security interest. 
When consolidating the findings of various approaches (direct interviews, third parties, 
literature review), it can be assessed that a strong interest in robust security regarding CBRN 
terror acts can be found in the following branches as defined by the United Nations Statistics 
Division: agriculture, certain industries (chemistry, shipping), electricity, gas and water 
supply, transport, storage and communications, financial intermediation, public administration 
and defence, and extra-territorial organizations and bodies. Further, some interest can be 
expected in the fishing industry, hotels and restaurants, real estate, renting and business 
activities, other community, social and personal service activities, possibly in wholesale and 
retail trade, and also in the health sector.  
Though it appears that branches that are most endangered by possible terrorist threats with 
CBRN substances indicate the private sector’s self interest in strong security, this study was 
not able to provide solid proof thereof. In regards to this finding, the unavailability of 
insurance against CBRN damages from terrorist acts is unfortunate. 
Recommendations 
•  The costs of countermeasures against CBRN threats by terrorists appear very high 
when compared to available financial resources, and, therefore, it is advisable that 
each measure proposed to enhance the security against CBRN threats by terrorists be 
carefully examined in regards to its need, efficiency and effectiveness. 
•  The literature review suggests that, in general, the investment in countermeasures 
appears to pay off, since the possible economic damage of a CBRN attack would be 
higher than the investments in countermeasures. One should not, however, jump to 
premature conclusions regarding the cost-effectiveness of countermeasures.  
•  The high damage costs are caused by singular events for which no probability can be 
determined. Hence, a sound cost-benefit analysis based on a risk assessment is often 
impossible. Therefore, decisions on countermeasures should be taken by looking into 
alternatives, including low-budget options. The investments should also be considered 
with the opportunity cost of the community in mind. Even without a CBRN attack, 
countermeasures may pay off, as long as they are also addressing the possibility of 
other incidents, such as natural disasters.  
•  The efficiency of countermeasures should be carefully considered; in particular, the 
possibility for terrorists to circumvent a preventive measure. In addition, the terror 
threat should be addressed from an analysis of its roots and possible ways and means 
to diffuse the motivations of terrorists. 
•  Every cost-benefit analysis done on CBRN countermeasures should clearly define its 
scope, the share of costs, the distribution of avoidable damage costs (internal as well 
as external) and possible synergies with other objectives, like protection against 
accidents. 
Branches that are most endangered by possible terrorist threats should receive adequate 
support. This could either be financial aid from the state or the availability of insurance 
against CBRN damages resulting from terrorist acts. iii 
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I. Introduction 
The first part of this report assesses the costs in relation to CBRN threats in a quantitative 
way. A system of matrices is used, in which costs are related to the different types of CBRN 
incidents, e.g. chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear events. Further, a differentiation 
is made between costs caused by the impact of CBRN incidents (1.1) and costs of 
countermeasures (1.2).  
 
After explaining this system, certain remarks on the currency translation and the inflation 
adjustment are made. The first chapter proceeds with a short overview of the economic impact 
of estimated casualties resulting from CBRN incidents and finishes with some qualitative 
considerations.  
 
The report continues with the presentation of the research results. In the second chapter, the 
different groups of CBRN incidents are examined using historical examples to illustrate 
chemical (2.1), biological (2.2), radiological (2.3) and nuclear incidents (2.4). 
After summing up the main results for each of the four sections – chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear incidents – the fifth chapter concludes with a final statement on this 
part. This final statement evaluates weaknesses and strengths with regard to the presented 
results, taking the working process into account. 
 
The second part should answer the question: Which sectors and companies have an interest in 
high security? To find this out, representatives from relevant industries have been interviewed 
regarding their financial expenditure on CBRN security
1, while third parties acting in the field 
of CBRN security were asked about their clients in various industries, specifically in 
reference to their clients’ interests in security.  
 
The qualitative assessment of interest in robust security is based on interviews with 
representatives from several industries. The industries were selected in accordance with the 
United Nations Statistics Division and evaluated with regard to the probability of them being 
attacked, as well as the resulting interest in security. Since information on such sensitive 
precautions is treated in a confidential manner (as is naturally the case in the area of risk 
aversion and protection against terrorist attacks), a detailed statement on the available security 
concepts or the financial resources employed to this end could not be expected. This was 
confirmed by interviews with representatives of the respective industries; either a statement 
on the topic was immediately rejected or, after expression of a sincere interest in security 
precautions, any further statement was refused for security reasons.  
 
                                                 
1   The questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. 2 
1. Categorisation of CBRN threats 
 
In order to investigate the possible economic impacts of CBRN attacks, it is essential to 
discuss the differences between the substances used. Furthermore, it is necessary to clearly 
distinguish between CBRN attacks, CBRN-related accidents, and criminal acts. 
 
The following definitions are used: 
 
CBRN threat is the most comprehensive term, describing a probable threat emerging from 
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances. Moreover it includes dangerous 
situations, which can arise intentionally (criminal acts, terror acts, acts of war) as well as 
unintentionally (accidents, natural catastrophes). 
 
CBRN incident refers to an incident that has already taken place, with damage caused by 
hazardous CBRN material.   
 
CBRN attack is also either a subcategory of CBRN threats or CBRN incidents depending on 
whether it is a hypothetical threat or an actual incident. One must further distinguish within 
these acts between terrorist attacks or attacks during a time of war. 
 




• Nerve agents (SARIN
3, VX
4) 
• Blood agents (hydrogen cyanide) 
• Choking agent (chlorine) 
• Blistering agents (mustard gas) 
 
Biological attacks 
• Poison (ricin, botulinum toxin) 
• Viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers, flu) 
• Bacteria (anthrax) 
• Plagues (black plague, tularemia) 
 
Radiological attacks 
• Radiological dispersal device (dirty bomb) 
• The spread of radioactive contaminants without a bomb or device 
• Poisoning of food or beverages with radioactive isotopes 
 
Nuclear terrorism 
• Attack on a nuclear facility 
• Explosion of a self constructed primitive nuclear bomb 




                                                 
2   Enders (2006), Institute of Medicine (2002), and White (2003) 
3   S chrader, Ambros, Rüdiger, Linde, chemical nerve agent 
4   An extremely toxic substance whose only application is in chemical warfare as a nerve agent 3 
II. Quantitative Assessments of economic impacts of CBRN 
threats 
1. Methodology 
The first step in the assessment of economic impact is to break down CBRN threats into 
major types
5, and the second step is to make a list of relevant costs. To relate these costs to the 
CBRN threats, a system of matrices is used in order to ensure the completeness of the 
investigations. 
1.1. Costs caused by the impact of CBRN incidents  
In this area there are three main cost categories related to first-response measures, recovery, 
reconstruction and restoration, as well as indirect damage. These are described in the 
following paragraphs and a detailed breakdown by cost items is presented in Table 1. 
 
First response 
Costs incurred by first response measures include: rescuing and evacuating people involved in 
an attack or accident, preventing the spread of dangerous material, cordoning off the 
contaminated areas, and immediate decontamination.  
Due to the fact that costs for first response measures usually are negligibly small, it is not 
expected to find much information about it in literature on CBRN incidents. 
 
Recovery, reconstruction, restoration 
Medium-term costs have to be taken into consideration in this section. Costs are incurred by 
measures such as health care for victims, pensions for the disabled, forensic tests on the 
deceased, as well as by funerals and life insurance claims paid out. 
Moreover, clean up measures have to be carried out; these include the complete 
reconstruction of destroyed buildings and infrastructure, resettlement measures, and 
decontamination, e.g. waste management of dangerous substances and the removal of any 
involved material, living or dead. 
 
Indirect damage costs 
Above all, the loss of earnings as a consequence of a CBRN attack has to be considered. In 
this regard there are several factors to consider: loss of earnings could be caused by a loss of 
consumer confidence, which could have an impact on the tourism sector for example. 
Generally speaking, the state of emergency and the resulting deadlock of a whole national 
economy affect earnings. Even a temporary infrastructure breakdown would affect the 
economy. Moreover, employees would not be able to work full-time due to injuries. 
In the long run, there would be certain effects in the macroeconomic context, such as loss of 
investor confidence or ensuing costs for injured employees. 
                                                 
5   See categorisation of CBRN threats. 4 
Table 1: Breakdown of costs caused by CBRN incidents 




•  rescue of injured and threatened people 
•  evacuation 
•  registration of contamination 
•  blocking the spread of dangerous CBRN materials 
•  immediate decontamination 








•  health care for injured people 
•  costs for the deceased (medical forensics, funerals, life insurances) 
•  pensions, etc for disabled people 
•  cleaning up measures and thorough decontamination 
•  reconstruction of  buildings 
•  resettlement and relocation 
•  restoration of  infrastructure: transport system, public services 
(water supply, electricity, telephone network) 
•  gathering of infected animals 
•  clearance of contaminated cadavers and plants 







•  loss of earnings caused by loss of consumer confidence 
•  loss of earnings caused by (preventive) culling 
•  loss of earnings caused by decline in tourism 
•  loss of earnings resulting from injuries/sicknesses or death of 
employees 
•  loss of earnings because of state of emergency (regional and 
international) 
•  economic impact of temporary infrastructure breakdown: 







•  consequential costs from loss of income (multiplier effects) 






1.2. Costs for countermeasures against CBRN incidents  
 
Regarding countermeasures against CBRN incidents, one can distinguish between costs for 
prevention of CBRN incidents and costs for protection against them. Both are described in the 




Research facilities and programmes must observe current developments in the field of CBRN-
related dangers. In order to anticipate an attack with CBRN material, certain monitoring 
networks have to be established. The main factor in this field is preparedness concerning risk 
assessment as well as training of security personnel, medical staff, certain specialists, and the 
threatened population. Moreover, warehouses containing CBRN materials must be kept under 
constant surveillance using portal monitors, security barriers, video observation, and, more 
generally, import and export controls.  
 
Protection 
In this context, protection actually means providing security for critical infrastructure and the 
general public with the help of access controls, portal monitors and security barriers in 
general. It is necessary to establish governmental and private organizations, which control 
certain security standards in order to assure a sufficient level of security.  
 
Preparedness 
This term describes costs spent to minimise direct consequences of CBRN incidents, for 
example capability of first response measures or costs for training of qualified persons and 
threatened citizens. 6 
Table 2: Breakdown of cost items for Counter-Measures against CBRN incidents 
 Chemical  Biological  Radiological  Nuclear 
Prevention  Stockpiling of antibiotics, diagnostics, vaccines and, management thereof 
 
Establishment and management of monitoring networks 
 





•  risk assessment 
•  situation awareness 
•  security personnel 
•  training of qualified persons and threatened populations 
•  governmental authorities and private organisations for situation 
observation and assessment 
 
Physical protection for the warehouses containing CBRN materials: 
•  portal monitors 
•  import and export control 
•  security barriers, fences, video observation 
Protection  Protection for the critical infrastructures and the general public against threats 
arising from CBRN terrorism/criminality/accidents: 
•  access control  
•  portal monitors 




•  risk assessment 
•  situation awareness 
•  governmental authorities and private organizations for situation  
•  portal monitors 
•  import and export control 
•  security barriers, fences, video observation 
•  access control  
•  protection against intrusion: security barriers, fences, video 
observation 
•  security personnel 
•  training of qualified staff and endangered populations 
•  governmental authorities and private organizations for the control of 
certain security standards 
Preparedness  •  training of qualified persons and endangered populations 
•  governmental authorities and private organizations for situation 
observation 
•  first response capabilities 
 7 
1.3. Qualitative remarks on cost figures
6 
 
Foreign currency translation and inflation adjustment 
 
All costs are given in Euros (exchange rate 2006). They have been converted after inflation 
adjustment by dividing by the GDP deflator (base year 2006). 
 
The amounts indicated in Euros (2006) are respectively added in italics behind the original 
values in the tables. 
 
Cross-counting cost comparison with GDP fraction 
 
In order to facilitate an evaluation of the costs, they are also given as a percentage of nominal 
GDP, which are noted in red letters following the values of € 2006 in scientific notification 
(nx10
m). 
1.4. Economic impact of casualties 
 
To estimate the economic impact of CBRN-related events, one could take into account other 
affects, such as the number of casualties. The amount and type of damage can be translated 
into a financial loss. With regard to cost figures, it is important to distinguish clearly between 
the economic value assumed for a lost life and compensation demands for a lost life. 
 
This paper also considers the expected number of dead and injured people resulting from a 
CBRN incident. The conversion of human life into economic form depends on an individual’s 
“worth” in terms of his or her earnings, time spent working, and money invested in education. 
 
According to a representative from an international insurance company
7, insurance companies 
have experienced that legal claims in respect of loss of human life are settled quite differently 
in different regions of the world. Publicly available loss statistics indicate that typically, 
settlements of fatality claims in the USA are often in the order of some million euros. 
 
The costs for the lifelong support of a young invalid are much higher than the economic loss 
caused by his death.  
 
The average economic values given represent a rough approach and can only be used to 
approximately estimate the economic impact of a CBRN event. 
                                                 
6   See International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and German 
Federal Bank 
7   A merican International Group, American insurance corporation 8 
2. Selected Historical Cases 
 
To provide a robust forecast, it would be necessary to refer back to numerous real terror cases. 
This is not possible, because there are only very few historic examples of chemical and 
biological terror acts, and none for radiological and nuclear ones. Therefore, studies that deal 
with the economic consequences of historic CBRN incidents are used. 
 
Examples used for CBRN incidents are: 
 
Chemical incident: 1995 attack by Aum sect in the Tokyo subway system 
Biological incident: Anthrax attacks of 2001 in the USA  
Radiological incident: Palomares accident of 1966 in Spain 
Nuclear incident: Atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945 
 
Only one historical example for every CBRN incident is presented. 
 
No historical examples are given for radiological and nuclear terror attacks, therefore, 
historical examples have been chosen that can be compared to terror acts in their 
consequences. It is very difficult to estimate the possible range of impact of a CBRN attack 
due to the complexity of the system used in the attack, as well as the dimensions of the attack 
itself. 
Palomares was chosen because of the contamination of agricultural land. The amount of 
contamination is comparable to that of a terror act. For a nuclear attack, studies treating the 
atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are used. In comparison to chemical, 
biological and radiological terror attacks, a nuclear terror attack is the least probable. 
 9 
2.1. SARIN attack of 1995 in Tokyo 
 
In the early hours of 20 March 1995, five members of the Japanese Aum sect deposited plastic 
bags, each wrapped in newspaper, on five commuter trains of three Tokyo subway lines. 
Inside the plastic bags was the neurotoxic substance SARIN. Immediately after the offenders 
left the trains, they cut the plastic bags with umbrellas to set the liquid SARIN free. The 
emitted fumes propagated into the subway trains as well as roughly 15 subway stations. 
Altogether 12 people died in the direct aftermath of the attack. More than 1,000 people were 
injured. The reason for the relatively small number of casualties is the low quality of the 
SARIN, the ineffective employment of the SARIN, and the effective reaction of Japanese 
security forces. 
8  
Table 3: SARIN attack of 1995 in Tokyo: injured and killed people 
Total number of 
injured people 
> 1,000 





                                                 
8   Pangi  (2002) 10 
2.2. Anthrax attack of 2001 in the USA 
 
In 2001 several attacks with anthrax were carried out in the USA. In each attack, anthrax 
spores were sent in granular form by post to broadcasting stations and newspapers. 
Furthermore, some letters were also sent to US senators. Several workers at the postal 
facilities that processed the letters fell ill with pulmonary anthrax. 
 
Altogether 22 people were infected with either cutaneous or pulmonary anthrax, and five of 
those infected with the pulmonary form died
9. Beyond the toll in human lives, the attacks also 
carried significant costs in terms of disruption and decontamination. Selected congressional 
office buildings were closed for periods of up to several months. More than a year later, postal 
facilities in Washington, DC, New Jersey, and Connecticut, and the AMI
10 building in Florida 
remained closed. The costs of decontaminating congressional offices and postal facilities will 
easily run into the tens of millions, if not higher. In addition to these costs stemming from 
direct remediation efforts, there are additional (not tabulated) economic costs resulting from 
the disruption of the postal system. 
 
The economic impacts are outlined below in a chronology of the anthrax attacks
11: 
15 January 2002:  US postal and law enforcement officials announce that the reward for 
information on the perpetrator(s) of the anthrax attacks will be increased to 2m USD. 
 
22 January 2002: Official announcement of the increase in the reward for information. In 
addition, postal and law enforcement officials announce that they will send out 500,000 flyers 
targeting central New Jersey and Bucks County, PA in a search of additional information. 
The Hart Office Building officially reopens after 96 days of quarantine and decontamination. 
The EPA
12 estimates that it has spent13.3m USD on clean-up operations, and expects the total 
cost to rise to 20m USD. 
 
26 March 2002: Postal officials estimate that it will cost 35m USD to clean both the 
Brentwood and Hamilton (NJ) postal facilities. 
 
26 July 2002: Postal service officials hold a press conference to announce that a test of 
decontamination techniques at the Brentwood facility will be conducted on 29 July. Postal 
officials also estimate that it will cost approximately 22m USD to decontaminate the facility. 
 
30 July 2002: Postal service officials in New Jersey announce that the Trenton Processing and 
Distribution Center in Hamilton will be reopened in the spring following a 20 million dollar 
decontamination and renovation process. 
                                                 
9    Hicklin (2002) 
10   American Media Inc. 
11   National Defense University (2002). 
12   E nvironmental Protection Agency 11 
Table 4: Economic impact of anthrax attack of 2001 in the USA 
Preventive costs  2m USD (€ 1.78m) to get information on the 
perpetrator(s) 1.97x10
-05 
Costs for decontamination  90.3m USD ( € 80.46m) 8.92x10
-04 
Total number of killed people  5 
Total number of injured people  22 
 12 
2.3. Palomares accident of 1966 in Spain 
 
On 17 January 1966, an accident involving US American nuclear weapons occurred on the 
south-west coast of Spain near the town of Palomares. A B52-bomber collided with a KC-135 
aircraft while refueling at a height of 9,000 metres, with both aircrafts crashing on Spanish 
terrain. Three of the four hydrogen bombs fell on the inhabited area of Palomares, the fourth 
fell into the sea. The safety precautions taken had helped in avoiding a thermonuclear 
explosion. However, the high-explosive burster charges detonated. Because of this explosion, 
radioactive material (plutonium) was dispersed across several hectares of agricultural land. 
Within three months more than 1,500 tons of radioactive contaminated soil was disposed of. 
 
Table 5: Palomares accident of 1966 in Spain. Economic impact 
Recovery, reconstruction, restoration  
 
Total costs for aircraft SALVOPS MED
13: 
10.23m USD (24.99 m €).6.1x10
-04 
14  
Clean-up costs per hectare after Palomares 











                                                 
13  Aircraft Salvage Operations Mediterranean, actions that resulted in the at-sea search, 
identification and recovery of one of the nuclear weapons. 
14   Field Command (1975) 
15   Baes (1986) 13 
2.4. Nuclear bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 
 
Only two examples in history exist to examine the impact of nuclear weapons on densely 
populated areas: the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima (6.8.1945, with an equivalent 16 
kilotons of TNT) and Nagasaki (9.8.1945, with an equivalent 21 kilotons of TNT). In this 
section, the number of dead and injured people resulting from the attacks is presented. No 
studies on the economic impact of the attacks have been found. Unfortunately, those 
parameters that have been taken into consideration vary substantially. The duration of the 
aftermath effects and the area that was affected are estimated. Furthermore, the causes of 
death or injury have not been specified. Normally, there are three direct causes of death and 
injury by a nuclear attack: heat wave, blast, and radiation. Of these effects, heat wave and 
blast are more substantial in their impact on innate objects and humans than radiation. Beside 
these three effects, the radioactive fallout causes cases of cancer and contamination of the 
surrounding area. In order to indicate the inaccuracy of information on the given numbers of 
deaths caused by cancer, such victims are classified under “death by non-specified cancer”.  
Inaccurate numbers of deaths and injured people are classified under “total sum of injured 
people” and “total sum of killed people”. 
 
Table 6: Attacks with nuclear bombs on Japan: dead and injured people 
People killed directly  45,000 in Hiroshima
16    
31,000 in Nagasaki
16  
Number of people who died in the aftermath 
of the attacks (cause of death not specified) 
15,000 in the first three weeks in Hiroshima
16 
60,000 in the first year in Hiroshima
16  
32,000 in the first three weeks in Nagasaki
16  
17,000 in the first year in Nagasaki
16  
Death by leukaemia in the aftermath of the 
attacks 
13 observed up to 1950 in Hiroshima
17  
10 observed up to 1950 in Nagasaki
17  
Death by non-specified cancer in the 
aftermath of the attacks  
31,881 between 1950 and 1997 for both 
cities
18  




72,000 injured and survived in Hiroshima
20  
25,000 injured and survived in Nagasaki
20  
Total number of killed people  140,000 in Hiroshima
21  
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3. Literature review 
  
The aim of the literature review was to find studies on CBRN attacks and to analyse their 
economic findings. As very few cases of CBRN terror attacks exist, the studies presented 
refer to CBRN incidents such as accidents and war scenarios. 
 
In relation to chapter 2, in which some historical examples are considered, this chapter also 
evaluates studies dealing with the possible impacts of CBRN attacks.  
This review is separated into two parts: the first part looks at nuclear threats and the second 
part at chemical, biological and radiological threats. The review is based mainly on publicly 
accessible literature.  
 
First, two studies which look only at the effects of nuclear weapons used in acts of war are 
introduced. There is hardly any literature on the use of nuclear weapons for terrorist acts, 
which may be due to the difficulty of implementation that such an act requires. On the other 
hand, there are many studies dealing with chemical, biological and radiological terror acts. 
Furthermore, an additional chapter looks at chemical, biological or radiological threats 
together. This chapter is mainly based on a rather general Swiss study entitled “Katarisk”. 
 
3.1. Literature base on CBRN threats  
 
The investigated studies differ in terms of their chosen economic contexts. One group looks at 
historical cases and evaluates their economic impact, while another estimates possible 
scenarios and their probable financial impact. A third group looks at financial efforts to 
prevent chemical, biological or radiological attacks or to minimise their consequences. 
Studies from the first and second group naturally focus only on costs that occur in the 
aftermath of such an incident. The parameters used in these studies vary, as do the number of 
examined or estimated damaging events. Few studies look at the impacts of all three 
hazardous substances mentioned on a global scale, at long-term and short-term effects, or at 
macroeconomic and microeconomic effects. Most studies only look at the impact of an attack 
with one substance on a finite region. An example for a study treating the impact of all three 
substances is the “Katarisk” study. See the summaries of these studies in the following 
sections: 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 deal with those studies that are substance-specific and 3.5 presents 
studies that cover all three CBR substances without making explicit distinction. The estimated 
costs are presented in appendix B. 
 
With regard to nuclear threats, two studies are used for this report: “Bombing Bombay”
22 and 
“Die wirtschaftlichen Schäden eines atomaren Krieges in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”
23 
(“The economic damages of an atomic war in the Federal Republic of Germany”). Both 
studies are discussed in chapter 4.5, and the predicted economic impacts are shown in the 
matrices in appendix B. 
 
Below are the summaries of the studies examined, divided according to the hazardous 
substance with which they deal. First, studies concerning terror acts are described, then those 
which deal with CBRN threats are looked at on a more general level. In both cases, the 
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consequences are comparable. As chemical, biological and radiological threats are sometimes 
discussed together in one study, there is a separate chapter for such reports.  
All expected economic impacts are listed in the matrices in appendix B. 
3.2. Chemical threats  
In regards to chemical terrorism, two studies are evaluated in this literature review. 
Schneidmiller (2005) discusses the increase in security by the US chemical industry. He 
directly connects these efforts to the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. A study that 
treats the consequences of a chemical attack is Pangi (2002) (see also section 2.1). Pangi 
describes the attack on the subway system in Tokyo by the Aum sect and specifies the number 
of killed and injured people.  
 
The Bhopal incident is looked at in detail because although it was not even caused by terrorist 
action, there is a large amount of literature on the incident. See the estimated values in 
appendix C. Though the Bhopal accident was a historical occurrence, and thus a well-defined 
event, estimates of the number killed are range between 2,500 and 17,500. 
 
Chemical threat is an area in which high costs are incurred. In order for the USA to ensure 
first response to such a threat, annual figures show that between 10 and 15 billion dollars are 
used. The Katarisk study covers the subject of directly estimated costs. The damage and loss 
figures estimated here are in the same order of magnitude as those assumed for potential 
radiological scenarios (several hundred million dollars). The indirect costs, on the other hand, 
turn out considerably higher, and various studies estimate them in billions (varying from 
several tens of billions to several hundred billion dollars). The costs needed for prevention are 
always in the region of several billion dollars. The costs needed for protection, however, are 
again in the region of the tens of billions of dollars, with the highest figure of 72 billion 
dollars.    
3.3. Biological threats  
 
Most studies were found in the field of biological attacks, some of which concern the 
financial expenditure on security surrounding biological attacks, e.g. Malakoff (2002), Trust 
for Americas Health (2007), Government Accounting Office (2003), Gursky (2004), Haase 
(2005), Carafano (2003), Gottron (2003), National Defense University (2003), Moodie 
(2003), National Defense University (2002), Davis (2002) and Armstrong (2004). All of these 
studies treat preventive costs, e.g. for vaccines, hospitals, biosensor networks, clinical 
research and food safety initiatives. A very detailed and well-researched study concerning 
preventive costs is Hunger (2005). It looks at the financial expenditure of various countries on 
bio-defense programmes. The estimated amounts are presented separately in Table 18 in 
Appendix B: Cost Matrices.In contrast to these studies, Wein (2005) looks at the possible 
impacts of a biological terror attack. He examines the number of casualties caused by a 
botulinumtoxin attack on the milk industry. A study regarding the real impact of a biological 
incident is, for example, Keogh-Brown (2008), who evaluates the financial impact by the 
SARS
24 epidemic in 2003. 
 
 
By far the greatest number of studies found deal with costs relating to biological threats. 
Figures for first response (some tens of billions of dollars) and for indirect costs (up to several 
hundred billion dollars) are in the same region as those for the chemical threats. Sums for 
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direct costs of recovery and reconstruction, however, are more than ten times larger than those 
for chemical and radiological hazards (in the billions). Prevention and protection costs are 
likewise in the same region as those for chemical threats, i.e. several billion dollars for 
prevention, and tens of billions for protection.  
 
3.4. Radiological threats 
 
Two studies concerning radiological attacks are used. Royal Society (2008) looks at the 
amount spent on the prevention and detection of, and response to, the illicit trafficking of 
radiological material that can be used for radiological dispersal devices. 
In his paper, Zimmermann (2004) discusses the possible financial damage of an attack with a 
radiological dispersal device (abbreviated as RDD). He assumes that the impact of such a 
RDD in New York would be at least as severe as the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center in Manhattan in 2001. 
 
A study investigating a number of fictional radiological incidents and the effects associated 
with them is that of Brown (2006). This study starts by describing the potential attack 
scenarios and ends by estimating the numbers of dead and injured resulting from them. Brown 
then discusses the costs that would be necessary to establish a nationwide detection network. 
 
Furthermore, two studies on the Goiania accident are presented. In de Freitas (2001) and in 
Natarajan (1998) the numbers of killed and injured people in Brazilian slums contaminated by 
137Cs in 1987 are given. 
 
As is for the Bhopal accident, many sources of information are available for the Chernobyl 
accident. For further details see Appendix D: The Chernobyl accident. 
 
First response in regards to radiological threats has not been taken into consideration until 
now. Costs for recovery vary across an enormous spectrum and are estimated to be anywhere 
from several hundred million dollars (Katarisk 2003) to several trillion dollars (Brown 2006). 
 
Costs for prevention of radiological attacks, at several hundred million dollars, are almost 
always less than the costs of prevention of chemical and biological incidents, which are 
estimated in the billions. The cost of protection from chemical and biological hazards is 
estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars.  17 
3.5. Chemical, biological and radiological threats 
 
The “Katarisk” study by the Swiss “Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz”
25 of 2003 considers 
the potential damage caused by environmental catastrophes, technological and social 
incidents. It provides extensive data concerning chemical, biological and radiological threats, 
and in terms of possible impacts, the basic costs can be transferred to the context of chemical, 
biological and radiological threats related to terrorism. 
 
First, the study analyses the potential risk of certain scenarios. Using data from past events, it 
develops representative scenarios, describes the expected frequency and the expected 
financial impact. Five factors are considered: the number of injured people and casualties, the 
number of evacuated people, the number of people who need the state’s support as a 
consequence of the incidence, the area of land damaged, and the costs for rebuilding 
measures. The different scenarios are evaluated in terms of monetary units so that they can be 
matched. In this context, the Katarisk study distinguishes between certain categories: category 
one describes events of daily life, while category five sums up the worst-case scenario. The 
estimated costs are all chosen from category five due to the fact that the expected CBRN 
impact will cause a worst-case scenario. 
 
In addition, three more studies dealing with chemical, biological and radiological attacks have 
been used: Dixon (2007) estimates the expected total financial loss in a large metropolitan 
area on the US Atlantic coast for an anthrax, a radiological and a SARIN attack. In order to 
compare Dixon (2007) to Katarisk (2003) it is necessary to gross up the expected financial 
impact by multiplying by a percentage of GDP. 
 
Chalecki (2001) and Shea (2004) present the real financial efforts by the US government to 
protect against CBR attacks (Shea only metions chemical and biological terrorism) and to 
reduce an attack’s effectiveness. 
 
The studies show that recovery and reconstruction after a biological incident tend to be the 
most costly, costing billions of dollars rather than hundreds of millions. Indirect costs for all 
three types of threats, however, amount to the same amount (several hundred million up into 
the hundred billions).For prevention and protection, the respective costs for all three 
hazardous materials are estimated in the same general region of several tens of billions of 
dollars. The economic aspects and expected financial impacts are shown in the matrices in  
appendix B. 
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3.6. Nuclear threats 
One of the latest current studies regarding the theoretical impact of an attack with a nuclear 
weapon is “Bombing Bombay” by M.V. Ramana. As a result of India’s and Pakistan’s 
nuclear tests in May 1998 and the conflict between these two countries, this topic gained 
importance. The report describes the direct effects of a nuclear detonation over the Indian city 
of Bombay. Bombay presents a typical target of a nuclear attack in a war. With a population 
of about ten million, Bombay is one of the biggest Indian cities and is India’s largest financial 
and industrial centre. Furthermore, Bombay has a big naval and commercial port. Ramana 
calculates the number of casualties following the detonation of a nuclear weapon in terms of 
people killed directly by: 
  
1.  thermal radiation and resulting large-scale firestorms  
2.  shock waves and accompanying high-speed winds  
3.   prompt radiation  
 
His estimates of the number of casualties do not regard long-term effects, such as cancer or 
genetic mutations. These long-term effects would, as Ramana stresses, lead to thousands of 
casualties. Ramana estimates the number of deaths resulting from an attack with a 15-TNT-
kiloton equivalent bomb (similar to the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki). For this 
attack, he assumes ideal conditions, like a clear day and an explosion height of 600 metres.   
He also estimates the death toll for a 150-TNT-kilotons equivalent bomb (like modern 
hydrogen bombs). 
  
If terrorists were to detonate a bomb on the ground, the effects of a heat wave would be 
slightly reduced and the local radioactive fallout would be enhanced.
26 
 
Table 7: Total sum of killed people in “Bombing Bombay“ 
Total sum of killed people  •  160,000 to 866,000 in case of 15 TNT kilotons 
•  736,000 to 8,660,000 in case of 150 TNT kilotons 
 
A further study that treats the possible amount of casualties in a nuclear attack is 
“Mathematische Analyse der Wirkungen von Kernwaffenexplosionen in der BRD”
27. This 
study is part of a compilation of several studies, analyzing the consequences of a nuclear war 
in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1960 and 1970
28.This study calculates the 
impact of a nuclear weapon with a 20 Mt TNT equivalent on the city of Hamburg. The 
number of casualties of such an attack is estimated to be 1,270,000, while the number of 
injured at 463,000. 
 
Another study treating the effects of nuclear weapons especially on economic effects is: 
“Die wirtschaftlichen Schäden eines atomaren Krieges in  der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
und ihre Folgen“
29. Likewise from the same collection as the Sonntag study. The author 
examines the possible costs in three different economic fields: 
 
•  destruction of production facilities (which in the matrix is listed under “Recovery, 
reconstruction, restoration”) 
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•  destruction of the means of existence (which in the matrix is listed under “Indirect 
damage costs”)  
 
•  breakdown of organisation (direct and indirect costs) 
 
The economic impacts on these fields are examined in nine different war scenarios. These war 
scenarios differ in regard to the number of nuclear weapons used and the affected areas. Every 
war scenario depicts the actual status immediately after the weapon exertion and neglects 
dynamic processes. The assumed effects of the nuclear bombs are blast, heat wave, and 
fallout. The economic calculations are based on the population and the industrial 
circumstances of 1961.  
 
For the first example, the author considers the number of destroyed industrial facilities. 
Furthermore he estimates the proportionality of industrial productiveness of the number of 
employed people in these industrial facilities. To calculate the exact outage of employed 
people, he takes towns and administrative districts as the smallest population unit. The effects 
of a nuclear weapon exertion are estimated according to these units. In contrast to the first 
estimation, the second concerns the essential production capabilities to ensure the survival of 
the population
30. For this estimation the author considers the percentage of minimal industrial 
resources related to the production. They equal around 80% of the real given industrial 
facilities. For the third point, which is handled in a qualitative mode, no financial results have 
been calculated. 
 
The main difference compared to “Bombing Bombay” is the higher number of nuclear bombs 
used in the scenario. Reich constructs a typical scenario of the cold war period, presuming 20-
30 nuclear weapons (equivalent to 20 Mt TNT) dropped on German industrial regions.  
This is a realistic scenario for a war, but not for a terrorist act. In a terrorist attack, the use of 
one nuclear bomb at most is probable. It is not possible to compare the scenarios drawn by 
Ramana and Reich for several reasons. Ramana concentrates on a possible attack targeting a 
single city using a nuclear weapon, similar to that used on Hiroshima, and estimates the 
number of people killed. In contrast, Reich looks at the monetary impact on industrial areas 
caused by the usage of about 20-30 hydrogen bombs.  
 
 
Table 8: Total direct costs in Reich (1971) 
Recovery, reconstruction, restoration  (63 – 93 b Deutsche Mark per year (182. – 
271 b € per year) (8.24 – 12.23) 
 
While a terrorist attack using nuclear weapons is not highly probable, the scenario Reich 
creates is not very probable at all. However, the strength of Reich’s study lies in the extent of 
his analysis of the possible consequences of a nuclear attack. The extent of the damages 
caused is not proportional to the number of weapons used. Therefore it is not possible to 
break down and transfer Reich’s estimates into the framework of another attack using a bomb 
with less explosive force, such as described by Ramana. 
 
Nevertheless a standardisation of the effects (on linear assumptions) described in Reich 
(1971) is possible. There are two possibilities for this: on the one hand, it is possible to 
determine an upper threshold by dividing by the number of nuclear weapons used, and on the 
other hand a lower threshold, by scaling down the number of nuclear weapons (Reich assumes 
hydrogen bombs, Ramana bombs of the Hiroshima type). 
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Upper standardisation threshold: the scenario described by Reich involves the use of 20 to 30 
nuclear weapons; if we divide his estimated figures of 182 – 271 billion euros by 25 (mean 
value of assumed bombs), the result is 7.28 – 10.84 billion euros. 
 
Lower standardisation threshold: Reich assumes the effect of several 20 Mt bombs. For 
standardisation to the same number of bombs of the Hiroshima type (15 kt), a division is 
made by the ratio of the two figures (1,333.3). The values standardised to bombs of the 
Hiroshima type are 140m to 200m euros. 
 
The values given as upper and lower thresholds can also be scaled down to one single bomb 
of the Hiroshima type. Damage would then be estimated between 5.6 and 8.1 million euros.
31 
When considering the potential for damage of such a bomb in a present-day urbanized setting, 
this figure seems quite low. It indicates a lack of available data in order to produce a more 
plausible figure. 
                                                 
31 This is a very rough calculation of the expected economic damage. Furthermore, two points have to be 
mentioned to assess these calculations in an adequate way. At first, Reich estimates only the direct damage 
concerning destroyed buildings, infrastructure, industry facilities, etc. No following economic effects caused by 
breakdown of infrastructure or loss of production are respected. He secondly did not regard psychological effects 
that can lead to economic effects or numbers of casualties.  21 
5. Final statement on quantitative assessments 
 
As explained above, it is rather difficult to compare all these studies on CBRN attacks. 
Because of the small number of historic terror cases, it is also necessary to look at CBRN 
accidents. 
 
Without a larger number of cases to evaluate, it is very difficult to estimate the possible 
economic impacts, even without differentiating between incidents caused deliberately (mainly 
terror acts) and fortuitous events like accidents. At any rate, the consequences would not be 
the same in the majority of cases. Therefore the expected possible economic impact diverges 
greatly.  
 
Remarks on studies regarding potential impacts of CBRN attacks 
 
The studies considering potential scenarios vary in terms of extensiveness (e.g. type and 
number of weapons used, concerned area, geographical characteristics) and the economic 
consequences analysed (macro- and microeconomic, direct and indirect costs, number of 
casualties). The studies are shown in a diagram below, with the comprehensiveness of 
regarded economic impact on the horizontal axis and the dimension of the attack on the 























































Comprehensiveness of regarded economic impact
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of the attack vs. the comprehensiveness of regarded economic impact. All studies 
dealing with possible scenarios are included. 
 
For studies on real attacks, this classification is not sensible, because only attacks using one 
substance for a certain target and the economic consequences they caused were analysed. 
 22 
Even the financial expenditures to prevent such attacks or to minimise their consequences 
vary widely. It was also determined that the terms used in the literature such as “indirect 
costs” or “prevention costs” were employed in a very general manner and in fact used in a 
different manner at times. This makes it even more difficult to compare the amounts found 
with regard to these keywords.  
 
The information on costs differs in the various studies to a large degree. The figures chosen 
are presented in the following table. They cover broad economic aspects and are explained in 
more detail in the following paragraph. See also Appendix B: Cost Matrices for a short 
description of the studies selected. 
 
Table 9: Costs caused by the impact of chemical, biological and radiological threats 
 Chemical  Biological  Radiological 
First response    Between 10 and 30 
billion USD per 
year. 
(8.48b to 25.44b 




















with risk aversion 
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CHF 2,010m/year 
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Table 10: Costs for Counter-Measures against chemical, biological and radiological threats 
 Chemical  Biological  Radiological 
Prevention  > 2b USD  
(1.64b €)  
1.82x10
-01  37 
 
1.748b USD 
(1.53b €)  
1.59x10


















Preparedness    Between 10 and 
30 billions USD 
(8.48b to 25.44b 








Remarks on the figures of table 10 and 11: 
 
Because of different estimates in the used studies, short explanations are present below.  
 
The figures for the indirect damage costs and the costs for protection are related to general 
CBR scenarios. A categorisation of the various effects of single substances has not been made 
within these studies. Only in the field of costs for first-response measures associated with a 
radiological attack was no information found.  
 
Since the data presented refers to several countries, it is hardly possible to draw a comparison. 
The costs for first response measures are related to the USA. They represent expenditures not 
only calculated, but also actually spent. In contrast, the amount of money given in the table 
for probable damages is based on a national catastrophe scenario for Switzerland. 
 
Moreover, the indirect damage costs are also based on a model calculation. It works out the 
probable costs for the whole US economy as a result of an attack on a large US port using a 
chemical, biological or radiological weapon. For the field of prevention, separate information 
is available for all three sectors. The US chemical industry, for example, has spent more than 
two billion dollars since the 9/11 attacks in order to improve its security. With regard to 
biological terror threats, the USA has various security programmes, which have been running 
over several years. These programmes include clinical research, and research regarding 
therapeutics, drugs and vaccines, and construction and renovation of biosafety laboratories. 
 
The European Union has invested more than 200 million euros in detection of and response to 
illicit trafficking of radiological material in order to prevent radiological attacks. This value is 
clearly greater compared to the values employed by European countries within the scope of 
security against biological attacks (compare with the values in Appendix B in Hunger (2005). 
If one compares the values indicated in Brown (2006) for the introduction of a blanket 
detection system (> 500m USD), then it can be seen that the amounts are on the same scale. 
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The efforts to equip American harbours with so-called ASP
42 monitors have been postponed 
in order to save on costs for the time being. The costs of development and procurement of the 
ASP monitors require about 1.2 billion USD.
43 
 
The table refers to the cumulative expenditure of the US government in the fiscal year 2001 
for security for chemical, biological and radiological terrorist attacks. 
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III. Allocation of expenses for CBRN countermeasures on 




 This part of the report assesses which sectors and companies have an interest in security 
against CBRN attacks and which do not. For this reason, industries and sectors are classified 
according to their interest in robust security. Interviews with representatives of selected 
companies or organisations were conducted to find out whether there is interest at all and how 
far the management is engaged in promoting it. 
To compile a register of possible industries and sectors interested in robust security, it will be 
helpful to obtain market estimates from companies that manufacture devices for protection 
against CBRN hazardous substances. This will provide an overview of possible customers, for 
example public authorities requiring security, but also private institutions. This can be done in 
two ways: First, one can determine the level of interest by asking industry representatives 
directly. Second, it is possible to determine the level of interest by speaking to third parties
44. 
Examples of third parties: 
Suppliers and distributors of technical equipment or facilities used to prevent such attacks as 
well as to minimise the consequences in the aftermath. For example, in the field of prevention 
there are producers of detection or control systems. Furthermore, there are companies that 
produce technical equipment to deal with the aftermath of a CBRN attack, for example 
protective clothing. Most of this technical equipment is not specific to terrorist attacks. 
Conclusions can only be drawn regarding measures against CBRN threats in general. 
The questions posed to industry representatives aim at obtaining concrete information on the 
security precautions as well as the associated costs. However, for security reasons, precise 
specification could not be expected, but only information on whether there is any interest at 
all in security against CBRN attacks and whether precautions have been taken for protection. 
To assess the different players in the above-mentioned industries and sectors with regard to 
CBRN threats, three factors must first be considered: 
a) What does the financial loss incur, i.e. the issue of internalities and externalities? 
In economics, an externality is an impact on any party not directly involved in an economic 
process. The impact of a CBRN terror attack is to be seen as a reason for an unintentional 
economic process (in the perception of the directly affected party). An externality occurs 
when an economic activity causes external costs
45. 
Inevitable to the issue of internalities and externalities is to what extent the consequences of 
this terror act affect other parties. The second part of this deliberation leads to the question: 
Other than the direct target of the attack, who is damaged? Naturally, companies will insure 
themselves against damages that affect them directly. 
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b) Why me? (Game Theory)  
For companies that are affected especially by intangible assets, the incentive to insure 
themselves is eminently high. This is because of the high loss in confidence in industries such 
as transportation and travel companies or food-store and food supply chains. 
However, the incentive for a company to insure itself is diminished if it does not expect to be 
affected directly. It hopes that other companies will provide insurance or at least financial 
means to minimise the impacts of a CBRN attack. Such decisions are apparently rational but 
occur in restricted conditions (theory of Collective Action
46) and result in cases of 
underinsurance. The economic theory of Collective Action is concerned with ensuring the 
Common Good through the collaboration of two or more individuals and the impact of 
externalities on group behaviour. Olson’s theory explores market failures where individual 
consumer rationality and firms’ profit-seeking do not lead to efficient provision of the 
Common Good, i.e. where another level of provision would provide a higher utility combined 
with lower costs. 
  
 c) Public Interest or Common Good 
One can explain the same phenomenon in another way: the absence of attacks is a Common 
Good, the appearance of attacks is a Common Bad.  
Under certain conditions private players will produce a Common Good, which normally has 
to be done by the state. In some cases, only the state has the financial assets to react to a 
CBRN attack and to minimise the impacts.   
The main characteristic of a Common Good as well as a Common Bad is that they affect 
everyone, and nobody can extract themselves from the effects. Furthermore, the damage of 
one affected player does not decrease the amount of damage on another affected player.  
From these deliberations the following hypotheses are deduced to divide market participants 
and industries into three categories, with regard to their interest in insurance against CBRN 
attacks. These categories differ in the degree of probability of being potentially direct or 
indirect targets for CBRN attacks: 
a) Category 1: Market participants and industries that are directly and indirectly affected by 
CBRN attacks will insure themselves and spend money on minimising the impacts of a 
CBRN attack in an adequate way.   
b) Category 2: Market participants and industries that are directly affected by CBRN attacks 
will underinsure themselves and spend money on minimising the impacts of a CBRN attack in 
a minimal way. 
c) Category 3: Market participants and industries that are indirectly affected by CBRN 
attacks will insure themselves and spend money on minimising the impacts of a CBRN attack 
in an insufficient way. 
 
Examples for the three categories:  
Category 1: airports, railroad companies, food-store or food-supply chains, sports stadiums  
Category 2: suppliers (water, energy) 
Category 3: industrial plants, for example car manufacturers  
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It is difficult to distinguish between market participants and industries that are affected by a 
CBRN attack either in a direct or in an indirect way. For example, any industrial producer 
could be a possible direct target of an attack. In this case, this industrial producer would fall 
into category 2. However, the same producer could belong to category 3 if, for example, main 
logistical nodal points are damaged or supply chains are broken. In this case there would be 
only indirect damage. 
The issues of self-interest in robust security are the same for all three categories. The main 
difference between these categories is the extent of the insurance and the additional financial 
expenditure (for technical, personnel or logistical arrangements).  
In addition to the surveys, the sponsors of the specified costs were searched for in the related 




2.1. Branches according to the United Nations Statistics Division 
In order to make a distinction between individual branches, the Unite Nations Statistics 
Division
47, which defines the following 17 industries, was relied upon: 
 
•  Agriculture 
•  Fishing 
•  Mining and quarrying 
•  Manufacturing 
•  Electricity, gas and water supply 
•  Construction 
•  Wholesale and retail trade 
•  Hotels and restaurants 
•  Transport and communications 
•  Financial intermediation 
•  Real estate, renting and business activities 
•  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
•  Education 
•  Health and social work 
•  Other community, social and personal activities 
•  Private households with employed people 
•  Extra-territorial organisations and bodies 
 
In addition to this list, the self-interest in robust security for broadcasting corporations and 
newspaper publishing companies should also be estimated. 
2.2. Categorisation of branches in terms of their interest in robust 
security against CBRN threats 
 
To determine their interest in robust security, representatives from branches with a high-risk 
potential in CBRN attacks are considered. Different industries are not equally attractive as 
targets. For the evaluation, certain branches with an assumed high attack potential were 
chosen. 
                                                 
47   http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm, see UNO (2006) 29 
2.3. Selected branches 
 
Agriculture: This sector has to be considered as extremely sensitive. An attack in the 
agriculture sector could tie up large parts of the food-processing industry. Thereby the 
livelihood of the majority of the population could be endangered. Furthermore, the damage 
caused by a loss of confidence is immense and can affect agricultural undertakings, as well as 
the food processing industry. For loss in confidence see e.g. the immense impacts of BSE
48, 
which was of course not an attack, but a biological incident. 
Hypothesis: Representatives of this branch fall into category 1. 
 
Production: Industrial plants and production facilities are good examples of locations where 
direct damages can occur. Through the disruption of important logistical nodal points, 
externalities could occur. 
Hypothesis: Representatives of this branch fall into category 2 or 3. 
 
Energy and water supply: Like the agricultural sector, the field of energy and water supply is 
also very sensitive. In contrast to the agricultural sector, the effects of a possible loss of 
confidence are not that drastic.  
Hypothesis: Representatives of these branches fall into category 1. 
 
Transport and communications: The effect of attacks on these branches will primarily affect 
externalities in other branches.   
Hypothesis: Representatives of these branches fall into category 2. 
 
Credit and insurance companies: Representing the western economic system, financial centres 
such as the stock market in Frankfurt are places with great symbolic value. 
Hypothesis: Representatives of these branches fall into category 2 or 3. 
 
Public administration and defence: One has to distinguish between attacks on e.g. 
administrative buildings that could indirectly impact other industries and representative 
attacks. 
Hypothesis: A categorisation is rather difficult, for example military facilities abroad fall in 
category 1. 
 
Health system: highly attractive target because of great direct impact by a CBRN attack 
Hypothesis: Representatives of this branch fall into category 1. 
                                                 
48   B ovine spongiform encephalopathy 30 
3. Market enquiries  
3.1. Questionnaire 
 
To gain an overview of the efforts made in the field of CBRN-related security measures, each 
representative was given a questionnaire
49 to answer. The first question is whether the 
organisation is highly endangered by CBRN attacks or not. The second question is whether 
there are security undertakings over and above the statutory security regulations and if so, 
what these measures are. The representatives answered these questions with regard to direct 
and indirect consequences of CBRN attacks. Since, as mentioned above, it could not be 
assumed that more precise data would be provided on the respective security precautions, the 
questionnaire documents the sensitivity of the questions posed. 
 
Since presentation of the questionnaire was thus only used as an indicator of general interest, 
expert groups having more concrete estimates on the security requirements and any 
implemented precautions were also surveyed. 
 
The questionnaire was sent per Mail after contacting the representatives via e-mail or phone. 
3.2. Expert groups 
 
Additionally, appraisements of expert groups in the field of CBRN security should help 
address the question of whether there is self-interest in robust security in some industries or 
not. Most importantly are measures taken that exceed the statutory regulations. 
 
3.2.1. Insurance companies 
 
One can assume that the level of insurance against direct or indirect effects of a CBRN attack 
is related to self-interest in CBRN security. Therefore, insurance companies are questioned 
regarding their allocation of customers in the field of CBRN incidents. The expenditures for 
insurance against CBRN attacks involve minimisation of the impact costs. 
   
It is fundamental to distinguish between two kinds of insurance: 
 
1.  insurance of property 
2.  casualty insurance 
 
The German
50 insurance law does not honour claims against third parties in cases of so-called 
“Acts of God”, such as a terror attacks. Therefore no casualty insurance exists for victims of 
terrorism. In contrast, the possibility of property insurance in cases of an “Act of God” exists. 
The only German insurance company that offers insurance against terror acts is the Extremus 
AG in Cologne. The results of this interview with a representative of the Extremus AG are 
presented in chapter 4. 
                                                 
49   The questionnaire can be found in Appendix A 
50   Only the legal situation in Germany was taken into consideration since the surveys involve German industry 
representatives. 31 
3.2.2. Security agencies and control agencies 
 
In Germany there is a fairly large number of agencies and institutions that deal with national 
security. Four representatives (three security agencies and one control agency) were asked to 
give an estimation of the likelihood of a CBRN attack and their interest in robust security. 
The results are presented in chapter 4. 
 
As explained above, the self-interest in robust security can be estimated in the financial 
expenditure exceeding the statutory regulations. These optional as well as the statutory 
security arrangements (technical and logistical) are controlled by independent organisations, 
such as the TÜV
51.  
 
3.2.3. Producers of security equipment and safety advisers  
 
In the field of security, there are producers of technical security equipment e.g. detection 
systems or protection clothing. Moreover, security consultant companies provide advice to 
clients regarding the necessity of CBRN security measures. Within the scope of the 
investigations, the manufacturer of detectors for locating radioactive substances (Thermo 
Fisher AG) and a company working in the area of security consulting (vdlconsult) were also 
surveyed. 
Countermeasures are involved in the case of the costs incurred through the employment of 
producers of security equipment and safety advisers. 
 
3.2.4. Selected branches representatives 
 
In order to evaluate self-interest in security with regard to CBRN attacks, representatives from 
different industries were interviewed. The degree of probability of being targeted by a CBRN 
attack was the main criteria used to evaluate the relevant industries. 
 
The interviews were conducted with the help of a standardised questionnaire, which is 
attached in Appendix A: Questionnaire. 
 
The qualitative assessment of interest in robust security is based on interviews with 
representatives from several industries. Adapted from the classification of industries 
according to the United Nations Statistics Division, which lists 18 industries, contact was 
taken up in eleven representative industries, out of which altogether 19 representatives were 
questioned. While seven did not react at all, six confirmed an interest in CBRN-related 
security, declining further explanations for safety reasons. Five participants were not able to 
provide information in time. A surveyed representative (from the university hospital) did not 
regard himself as a possible target of an attack. 
 
See table 13 for the representatives asked. 
 
 
                                                 
51   T echnischer Überwachungs-Verein 32 
4. Enquiry results 
 




The Extremus AG in Cologne provides insurance policies against terrorist attacks
52, but 
CBRN attacks are categorically not covered 
53. Nevertheless, interest in this field exists. 
According to a representative of the Extremus AG, there are three main industries frequently 
enquiring after such an insurance offer: 
 
•  hotels 
•  chemical industry 
•  real estate 
 
 
Table 11: Self-interest in robust CBRN security, appraisal by Extremus AG 
Branch  Is there an interest in insurance 
with regard to CBRN-attacks? 
Agriculture Not  specified 
Fishing Not  specified 
Mining and quarrying  Not specified 
Manufacturing Yes  (especially chemical industry) 
Electricity, gas and water supply  Not specified 
Construction Not  specified 
Wholesale and retail trade  Not specified 
Hotels and restaurants  Yes (especially hotels) 
Transport, storage and communications  Not specified 
Financial intermediation  Not specified 
Real estate, rental and business activities  Yes 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 
Not specified 
Education Not  specified 
Health and social work  Not specified 
Other community, social and personal 
service activities 
Not specified 
Private households with employed 
persons 
Not specified 
Extra-territorial organisations and bodies  Not specified 
Broadcasting stations, newspapers  Not specified  
 
                                                 
52 The Extremus AG covers compensation demands up to 10 billion euros per year for risks with a total sum 
insured exceeding 25 million euros. The Extremus AG itself compensates amounts up to 2 billion euros, the 
remainder (at most 8 billion euros) is paid by the government. This agreement is valid until 31 December 2009. 
 http://www.extremus.de/unternehmen_geschichte.phtml 
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Security agencies and control agencies 
 
The following responses were received from three institutions working in this area
54:  
 
•  Behörde für Inneres der Stadt Hamburg (BfI
55): The BfI is responsible for any security 
concerns of the city of Hamburg. This includes the hazard of CBRN attacks. A 
representative from the department for Disaster Control at the BfI, and a member of 
the Hamburg fire brigade were contacted but refused to make a statement. 
 
•  Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk (THW
56):  The THW is a federal agency and 
subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. It has functions in the field of disaster 
control, especially in averting CBRN-related danger. For this reason, special CBRN 
task forces are available. A member of the CBRN defence team (Länderverband 
Bremen/Niedersachsen) explained that there are no variations in the safety concepts in 
the industries involved in an attack. Consequently, the THW is unable to make an 
appraisal of CBRN endangerment. 
 
•  Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz BfS
57: The BfS has its headquarters in Salzgitter and is 
the federal agency responsible for radiation protection. Our request to speak to an 
expert was denied for safety reasons. 
                                                 
54   Another institution did not respond at all. 
55   Hamburg Office of the Interior   
56   German Federal Agency for Technical Relief 
57   German Federal Office for Radiation Protection 34 
Producers of safety features and equipments 
In the field of preventive measures against CBRN substances, detectors to investigate such 
material are widely used. The Thermo Fisher AG produces detectors for radioactive material. 
Their client list reveals that mainly the steel industry, companies that deal with old industrial 
material, the waste recycling industry, as well as nuclear power plants use this technical 
device
58. An interest in security can be concluded, but realistically it is accidents rather than 
acts of terror that are predominantly assumed. 
Furthermore, the Thermo Fisher AG sells security products in order to anticipate the 
emergence of any dangerous situations. For example, portal monitors are used at airports or to 
check containers in order to detect illegally transported radioactive substances,
59 which may 
involve terror activities. In this regard, the monitors constitute a preventive measure.  
 
Consulting in Safety 
 
Apart from the demand for technical security support, industries also require security 
consulting. Mr Jürgen K. von der Lippe is the Executive Director of vdlconsult, a German 
company which advises companies on security questions. He considers the following 
economic sectors to be most endangered by CBRN attacks: all buildings with a high symbolic 




An interest in security is related to the possibility of being a target of such an attack. In 
addition to symbolic and political factors, the number of people that could potentially be 
killed or injured by a CBRN attack is also an important consideration. Models that could 
predict the possibility of an attack have to take into account political situations, social 
environment, security arrangements and the number of reachable possible casualties
61.  
 
                                                 
58   Thermo (2008) 
59   For example Nürbchen (2003) and Thermo (2007) 
60   von der Lippe (2005) 
61   Such models are described for example in Kowalski (2003) or Arup (2002) 35 




Table 12: Self-interest in robust CBRN security, appraisal by vdlconsult 




Mining and quarrying  Not specified 
Manufacturing Yes 
Electricity, gas and water supply  Yes 
Construction Not  specified 
Wholesale and retail trade  Not specified 
Hotels and restaurants  Not specified 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Yes 
Financial intermediation  Yes 
Real estate, rental and business 
activities 
Not specified 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 
Yes 
Education Not  specified 
Health and social work  Not specified 
Other community, social and 
personal service activities 
Yes 
Private households with employed 
persons 
Not specified 
Extra-territorial organisations and 
bodies 
Yes 
Broadcasting stations, newspapers  Not specified 
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Selected branches representatives 
As was to be expected, representatives of industries considered to be highly threatened by 
CBRN threats – especially attacks – were not keen to respond to related questions. The 
selection of candidates would ideally have been based on appraisals by third parties, such as 
insurance companies and general security agencies (e.g. the German TÜV). However, in view 
of the expected limited response, representatives were selected at random. 
 
The results of these enquiries are shown in table 14.  37 
Table 13: Enquiry results 
Branch  Representative  Self-interest in robust 
security against CBRN 
attacks 
Agriculture  Large German dairy  Yes, anonymously mentioned 
in this report 
Fishing No  investigation   
Mining and quarrying  No investigation   
Manufacturing BASF
62 No  answer 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 
1.  Nuclear Power Plant 









2. No result 
Construction No  investigation   
Wholesale and retail trade  EDEKA Group
66 No  answer 
Hotels and restaurants  DEHOGA
67 No  answer 
Transport, storage and 
communications 







1. Yes arrangements not 
specified 
2.Yes, arrangements not 
specified 
3. No result 
 
Financial intermediation  The Hamburg Exchange  No answer 
Real estate, rental and 
business activities 
No investigation   
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security 
1.  Office of the Interior 
of Hanseatic City 
Hamburg 
2.  German Customs 
Office in Hamburg 
3.  Bundeswehr 
Command and staff 
college  
1.Yes, but arrangements are 
in general the same for other 
kinds of threats 
2.Yes, arrangements not 
specified 
3. No answer 
Education No  investigation   
Health and social work  University Medical Centre 
Hamburg-Eppendorf 
Do not assess themselves as a 
possible target 
Other community, social and 
personal service activities 
1.  HSH Nordbank 
Arena
70 
2.  Color Line Arena
71 
1. No answer 
 
2. No result 
Private households with  No investigation    
                                                 
62   Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, large German chemical company 
63   Large German energy providing company 
64   R heinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk, German electric power and natural gas public utility company 
65   This column distinguishes between “No result” and “No answer”. “No result” means that the contact to the 
representatives was made, but did not lead to a result. “No answer” means the absence of any reaction by the 
representative  
66   Large German supermarket corporation 
67   Deutscher Hotel und Gaststättenverband, largest German association for hotels and restaurants  
68   H amburger Verkehrsverbund. Hamburg public transport company 
69   German mobile network operator 
70   H amburg Schleswig Holsteinisch Nordbank, sports stadium in Hamburg 
71   Arena in Hamburg, used for ice hockey but also for larger events like concerts 38 
employed persons 
Extra-territorial  
organisations and bodies 









1.  They don’t want to be 
mentioned in relation 
to CBRN threats 
2.  No answer 
Three main problems arose in the course of these enquiries: 
1.  Many representatives did not want be mentioned within the context of a paper dealing 
with CBRN-related terrorism. Detailed statements were refused. 
2.  If there was interest in security issues related to CBRN attacks, specific comments 
were not given for safety reasons, and the information provided was strictly 
confidential. 
3.  The majority of the questioned representatives interested in CBRN-related security did 
not categorise measures taken against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
threats. 
                                                 
72   A rbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Consortium of public-law broadcasting institutions of Germany 39 
5. Final statement on cost allocation for CBRN Counter-Measures 
The intended aim of this market enquiry was to examine certain parties’ self-interest in robust 
security against CBRN attacks and to test the hypothesised categorisation explained in chapter 
2.3. 
Only a few rather general appraisals from third parties could be acquired. A few of the experts 
we approached in various institutions did not consider themselves accountable for security, or 
were not allowed to give any information as they were subject to professional secrecy (BfI, 
Hamburger Feuerwehr, BfS, THW) 
Furthermore, the results of the enquiries are not sufficient to strengthen the categorisation 
made in chapter 2.3 or to draw a differentiated map of the interests in robust security with 
regard to CBRN threats. Most answers were not very specific and in many cases there was 
simply no response. Only the UKE claimed not to consider itself as a probable target of a 
CBRN attack. 
But at least the yes/no estimate for various branches can be made. 
Table 15 serves as a comparison of the security interest determined in the course of the 
investigations with regard to the CBRN risk of attack. The test results from the surveys of 
vdlconsult and Thermo Fisher as well as from the interviews with industry representatives 
themselves are represented. A further column notes who has been indicated as a sponsor in 
the related literature that refers to the potential and actual costs. An interest can thus be 
derived from this cost unit. A final evaluation of interest was carried out in the last column. 
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Table 14: Comparison in self-interest in robust security regarding terror acts. Questioning results and 
appraisals 







a cost unit  
Evaluation 
of interest  
Agriculture Yes  Not 
specified 
Yes   -   Strong 
interest 
Fishing Yes  Not 
specified 







No investigation   -   No interest 

















































































No investigation   -  No 
evaluation, 
                                                 
73   One can assume wholesale as a potential terror attack. See, for example, the attacks on wholesale buildings 
of the Kaufhaus AG by a left wing terror group on April 2,1968 in Frankfurt am Main, Germany or the 
























































No result   -   No 
evaluation 
 
As a result of the investigation of the literature with regard to the specified cost unit, it may be 
said that while the state is generally designated as the carrier, in only a few specific cases has 
the state used money to protect its own government facilities. In most cases it must provide 
security for society as a whole and thus for the other industries as well. Hospitals as well as 
certain areas of industry (such as the chemical industry) were identified as non-government 




The first objective was to investigate the economic aspects of CBRN threats caused by 
terrorism, specifically the economic impact of a CBRN incident as well as the 
countermeasures previously analysed in publicly accessible academic literature. The second 
objective was to ascertain which sectors and companies have self-interest in robust security 
with regard to CBRN threats.  
 
Due to the limited number of historic terror cases, it is necessary to look at accidents as wel. 
In addition to purely academic literature, other qualified sources, such as governmental 
publications, were used to collect a reasonable base of data. With this still limited base of 
cases, it is hardly possible to draw general conclusions on the likely economic impacts, even 
if the differences between incidents caused deliberately (mainly terror acts) and fortuitous 
happenings like accidents were neglected.  
 
It is exceedingly difficult to compare the results of studies found on the economic impact of 
CBRN incidents. The incomparability consists both in the proportions of the incidents under 
consideration and in the comprehensiveness of the areas of economic impact for which are 
accounted. This does not only apply to hypothetical cases and scenarios, which, by their 
nature, have to account for a variety of assumptions. The effects often vary on several levels, 
even in the cases based on comparable assumptions, in particular if they refer to historic cases 
with well-defined effects. Consequently, the reported economic impact diversifies over a large 
range.  
 
In contrast to the studies of potential scenarios, it was to be assumed that those which involve 
actual historical cases would contain concrete figures. This is correct to the extent that 
singular effects were well recorded with regard to their monetary ramifications (for example, 
decontamination costs). However, the number of dead or injured, for which ample literature 
was found, often fluctuated considerably. In case of Chernobyl, the expected number of early 
cancer fatalities ranges from 1,200 to 75,000. For the Bhopal accident, the number of 
casualties is estimated between 2,500 and 17,500. 
 
The range of the studies, which deal with nuclear threat scenarios, was separated from the 
area of the other three hazardous substances. Although huge mortality figures (736,000 to 
8,660,000 in Ramana (1999)) or large economic losses (DM 63 – 93 b per year (€ 182 – 271 b 
per year) in Reich (1971)) are estimated, this involves war scenarios, which can not easily be 
compared to acts of terrorism. A crude scaling down to a single Hiroshima sized fission bomb 
results in a damage estimate of 5.6m to 8.1m euros. 
 
In the course of this study it became clear that studies in connection with biological incidents 
handle the largest monetary amounts. For example, in the Katarisk study the assumed possible 
direct damage from a biological disaster with CHF 2,010 million/year is 10 to 20 times 
greater than the expected amount of loss for chemical or radiological incidents. And in the 
case of indirect damage, biological incidents take first place in McKibbin (2006) with an 
estimate of 4.4 trillion USD (11% of the global GDP) for pandemic influenza. Likewise in the 
area of prevention and protection there is not only the most data, but the highest amounts for 
biological threats. 
 
The financial resources that are used for counter-measures against terrorist attacks also exhibit 
huge differences. In this area there was often an overlap with goals not related to the  43 
prevention of or the protection against CBRN terror, in particular regarding an increase of 
general security in the chemical industry. For some activities, CBRN terror is only a minor 
aspect, for instance the major objective of the destruction of chemical weapons is 
disarmament, but at the same time this investment prevents access of chemical weapons to 
terrorists. 
In general, the total impact costs of large incidents are very high, and are much higher that 
that of counter-measures. For biological threats, the indirect economic impact is assessed to 
be in the range of several billion to tens of billions of US dollars. The countermeasure cost 
range is much lower, ranging from hundreds of millions to about 10 billion US dollars. 
Taking the bio defence programmes alone, a few hundred thousand to tens of millions are 
spent by European countries for a reference year, while the USA invests about 200 million 
euros. 
 
The second aim of the paper was to examine certain parties’ self-interest in robust security 
against CBRN attacks by means of market enquiries. Third parties from the security sector 
were asked, as were representatives from various other industries. 
 
As was expected, there were few responses from the surveyed industry representatives. 
However, it must be taken into account that a publishing research establishment such as ZNF 
cannot expect to receive confidential statements regarding security issues. This lies in the 
nature of the topic, since the knowledge of security precautions often makes circumvention of 
the same possible. Thus as expected, the intended investigation through direct survey resulted 
in limited qualitative information and in no specific data with regard to the precise 
precautions and the resources deployed; but a conscious refusal to make any statement at all is 
a clear indication of the relevance of the topic. 
 
In contrast to this, insight into the security requirements was gained by surveying third 
parties. These third parties are consultants for preventive security measures and an insurance 
company specialized in terror attacks. They provided relevant estimates based on their own 
first-hand experience with customers and inquiries from various branches. By this indirect 
inquiry, it was guaranteed to keep the industry representatives themselves anonymous. As a 
result, it was found that primarily industries with a high symbolic value, as well as those 
representing numerous potentially threatened people, regard themselves at risk of attack and 
thus exhibit a security interest. 
 
According to the majority of the literature reviewed, the state is generally designated as the 
carrier of the costs. In a few specific cases, the state is reported to have spent the money on 
the protection of its own governmental facilities. In most cases it provides security for society 
as a whole and thus for the various branches of industry as well. Hospitals as well as certain 
areas of industry (such as the chemical industry and shipping companies) were identified as 
non-government investors interested in their own security. 
 
When consolidating the findings of various approaches (direct interviews, third parties, 
literature review) it can be assessed that a strong interest in robust security regarding CBRN 
terror acts can be found in the following branches: agriculture, certain industries (chemistry, 
shipping), electricity, gas and water supply, transport, storage and communications, financial 
intermediation, public administration and defence, and extra-territorial organizations and 
bodies. Further, some interest can be expected in the fishing industry, hotels and restaurants, 
real estate, renting and business activities, other community, social and personal service 
activities, possibly in the wholesale and retail trade sector, and the health sector. Though it 44 
appears that branches that are most endangered by possible terrorist threats with CBRN 
substances indicate the private sector’s self interest in robust security, this study was not able 
to provide a solid proof thereof. In regards to this finding, the unavailability of an insurance 
against CBRN damages from terrorist acts is unfortunate. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Questionnaire 
  Questions to direct effects 
 
•  Is your facility a potential direct CBRN assault? 
 
•  Are there more than statutory security standards regarding the direct consequences of 
a CBRN attack? 
 
•  Are these extra security arrangements preventive technical arrangements? 
 
•  If so, what are these technical arrangements? 
 
•  Are these extra security arrangements preventive logistical or personnel arrangements? 
 
•  If so, what are these logistical or personnel arrangements? 
 
•  Are these extra security arrangements reactive technical arrangements? 
 
•  If so, what are these technical arrangements? 
 
•  Are these extra security arrangements reactive logistical or personnel arrangements? 
 
•  If so, what are these logistical or personnel arrangements? 
 
Questions to indirect effects 
 
•  Are there possible effects on your facility caused in a CBRN attack on other branches 
or sectors? 
 
•  Are there more than statutory standards regarding the indirect consequences of a 
CBRN attack? 
 
•  Are these extra security arrangements preventive technical arrangements? 
 
•  If so, what are these technical arrangements? 
 
•  Are these extra security arrangements preventive logistical or personnel arrangements? 
 
•  If so, what are these logistical or personnel arrangements? 
 
•  Are these extra security arrangements reactive technical arrangements? 
 
•  If so, what are these technical arrangements? 
 
•  Are these extra security arrangements reactive logistical or personnel arrangements? 
 
•  If so, what are these logistical or personnel arrangements? 54 
Appendix B: Cost Matrices 
 
Costs caused by chemical, biological and radiological incidents 
 
Table 15: Costs caused by the impact of chemical, biological and radiological incidents collated in all 
literature used 
 Chemical  Biological  Radiological 
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€/year) 2.86x10
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02 without risk 
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Table 16: Killed and injured people caused by the impact of chemical, biological and radiological 
incidents collated in all literature used 
Killed people by 
CBRN event 




by CBRN event 
Some hundred 
(10) 
400,000 (12)  129 (13) 
Costs for counter-measures against chemical, biological and radiological incidents 
 
Table 17: Costs for counter-measures against chemical, biological and radiological incidents collated in all 
literature used 
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In reference points 5.1, 5.2, 14, 27, 30.1, 31 and 33 costs are not specified for one substance 
but for all three substances together. 
 
See below an explanation of the costs in the matrices: 
 
1) Removing low-level radioactive waste from a biomedical research facility to an appropriate 
storage facility.
74  
                                                 
74   Carafano (2004) 58 
2) Cost estimates to restore lower Manhattan after the September 2001 attack range up to 40 
billion USD plus loss of economic activity. The consequences of a large or super RDD might 
well be more costly.
75 
 
3) Costs for recovery, reconstruction and restoration caused by a chemical incident in 
Switzerland with nationwide dimension: 125m CHF/year (without risk aversion
76) and 190m 
CHF/year (with risk aversion) – (3.1) 
Costs for recovery, reconstruction and restoration caused by a biological incident in 
Switzerland with nationwide dimension: 2010m CHF/year (without risk aversion) and 7751m 
CHF/year (with risk aversion) – (3.2) 
Costs for recovery, reconstruction and restoration caused by a radiological incident in 
Switzerland with nationwide dimension: 118m CHF/year (without risk aversion) and 1546m 
CHF/year (with risk aversion) – (3.3). 
77 
 
4) The total amount for the introduction of detectors for locating illegally transported 
radioactive substances. Ports in the United States, the railroad system in the US and 
monitoring organisations are to be equipped with these detectors. In addition, the costs for 
training suitable technical personnel and for maintenance are taken into account (4.1). In 
contrast, the possible damage from contamination with a radiological bomb is indicated as 
amounting to several trillion or quintillion U.S. dollars (4.2).
78   
 




6) The pneumonic plague that broke out in Surat, India, in 1994 – costs for India because of 
its impact on tourism and exports.
80 
 
7) Loss of GDP on a global level (7.1) while 142.2 m people dying (7.2).
81 
 
8) Expected total financial loss in a large metropolitan area on the US-Atlantic coast in the 
event of outdoor anthrax (8.1), a radiological attack (8.2) and an indoor SARIN attack (8.3).
82  
 
9) GDP-loss Hong Kong: 3.7 b $US by SARS epidemic in 2003.
83 
 
10) Number of dead and injured people resulting from the SARIN attack on the Japanese 
Subway System in 1995.
84 
 
11) Number of people killed by 
137Cs accident in Goiania (Brazil) in 1987.
85 
                                                 
75   Zimmermann  (2004) 
76  Damages are calculated according to occurrence probability and the extent of loss under the assumption 
of risk neutrality. For values with risk aversion, an additional factor is whether a risk has a high extent of loss or 
not. If it does, a “risk tax” is assumed. This can be an additional verbal comment or the modelling of an aversion 
factor. See Schwermer (2007). 
    
77   KATARISK  (2003) 
78   Brown (2006) 
79   Küchle  (2008) 
80   Stern (2002) 
81   McKibbin (2006) 
82   Dixon  (2007) 
83   Keogh-Brown (2008) 
84   Pangi  (2002) 59 




13) Number of people accidentally exposed to 
137Cs in Goiania (Brazil) in 1987.
87 
 




15) Amount of money the Department of Health and Human Services has invested to prepare 
states and local public health departments and hospitals for public health emergencies and acts 
of bioterrorism since 9/11 (15.1) and since FY 2006, specifically for pandemic influenza 
preparedness, of which 600m USD has gone to state and local health departments (15.2). 
89 
 
16) U.S. - Implementing a protocol that allowed for access to existing or suspected facilities 
where biological-weapons-related work might be conducted (including no-notice inspections) 
could go far toward improving bio security worldwide. 
90  
 
17) In response to the terrorists attacks of 2001, the health resources and services 
administration distributed 125m USD in federal funds during 2002 to prepare hospitals for 
mass-casualty events, particularly bioterrorism. In 2003, the funding level increased to 498m 
USD and 515m USD has been allocated for 2004.
91 
 
18) The president’s fiscal year 2006 budget request for chemical demilitarisation programmes 
across the United States.
92 
 
19) Association of American Hospitals, cost estimation for preparing the nation’s hospital 
facilities for biotoxin attacks. 
93 
 
20) The U.S. chemical industry; to increase security since the Sept. 11 attacks.
94 
 
21) National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases bioterrorism research six-fold 
increased in the fiscal year 2003.
95 
 
22) The fiscal year 2004 budget for biodefense medical countermeasures, including 1.3 billion 




                                                                                                                                                          
85   de Freitas (2001) 
86   Wein  (2005) 
87   Natarajan (1998) 
88   Berry  (2007) 
89   Trust for Americas Health (2007) 
90   Sherman (2007) 
91   Gursky (2004) 
92   Nguyen  (2005) 
93   Carafano (2003) 
94   Schneidmiller (2005) 
95   Gottron  (2003) 
96   National Defense University (2003) 60 
23) The Bush administration requested more than a six-fold increase in bioterrorism research. 
Of this amount, 978m USA was to be for basic and applied research (441m USD for basic 
research; 195m USD for clinical research, and 342m USD for therapeutics, drugs and 
vaccines), 250m USD for procurement of anthrax vaccine, and 521m USD for construction of 
and renovation of Biosafety Level 3 and Biosafety Level 4 laboratories.
97 
 
24) European Commission: for the prevention and detection and response to illicit trafficking 
of nuclear and radiological material.
98 
 
25) In January 2002, President Bush signed into law a supplemental bioterrorism 
appropriation for states to help prepare their public health infrastructures for biological attacks 
(25.1). On January 25, 2002, DHHS Secretary Tommy Thompson announced the release of 
the first instalment to create regional hospital response plans for a bioterrorist attack (25.2).
99 
 
26) Louisiana State University – protection of laboratories with biological substances.
100 
 
27) Total direct costs of homeland security in the USA.
101  
 
28) The Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program, administered by HHS’s Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), provided funding in the fiscal year 2002 
through cooperative agreements to states and eligible municipalities to enhance the capacity 
of hospitals and associated health care entities to respond to bioterrorism.
102 
 
29) Total spending on civilian biodefence—including scientific research, vaccine production, 
and food safety initiatives—for fiscal year 2004, with an additional amount requested in the 
president’s fiscal year 2005 budget.
103 
 
30) Amount after 11 September 2001 that Congress and the White House requested (30.1) in 
emergency funds to address homeland security issues, including biodefence.  
In additional to this supplement, the President proposed a substantial increase in funding for 
future efforts to counter bioterrorism. The proposed 2003 budget requests (30.2) for improved 
biodefence, an increase of more than 300 percent over the previous year, targeted on 
improvements in three areas: infrastructure, response, and science.
104 
 
31) In the fiscal year 2001, requested amount of money to protect against chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear attack by the US government.
105 
 
32) Costs for a deployment of a biosensor network in 31 US-American cities. 
106 
 
33) Costs to provide sufficient depth of response to reduce a chemical, biological, or toxin 
attack’s effectiveness.
107 
                                                 
97   Moodie  (2003) 
98   Royal Society (2008) 
99   Davis (2002) 
100  Malakoff (2002) 
101  Hobijn (2002) 
102  Government Accountability Office (2003) 
103  Haase (2005) 
104  National Defense University (2002) 
105  Chalecki (2001) 
106  Armstrong (2004) 
107  Shea (2004) 61 
A further example of annual expenditure of different countries on biodefence programmes is 
shown in Table 18. 
 
Table 18: Information on bio defence programmes. 
108 
State  First and last year of 
declaration 
Level of funding declared in the most current 
submission 
Australia  1995 / 2003  0.9       m €  (0.914  m €)   
Belarus  1995 / 2003  0.14     m €  (0.14    m €)            
Belgium  1999 / 2002  6.16     m €  (6.25    m €)          
Canada  1992 / 2003  31.09   m €  (31.57  m €)          
China  1992 / 2003  0.2912 m €  (0.30    m €)           
Finland  1992 / 2003  0.07     m €  (0.07    m €)          
France  1992 / 2002  8          m €  (8.13    m €)          
Germany  1992 / 2003  5.2       m €  (5.28    m €)          
India  1997 / 1997  0.04     m €  (0.04    m €)          
Japan  2002 / 2003  0.02     m €  (0.02    m €)          
Netherlands  1992 / 2003  3.35     m €  (3.40    m €)         
Norway  1992 / 2003  0.29     m €  (0.29    m €)        
Russia  1992 / 2003  4.95     m €  (5.02    m €)        
South Africa  2000 / 2003  0.0096 m €  (0.0097m €)        
Spain  1996 / 2003  0.721   m €  (0.732  m €)        
Sweden  1992 / 2001  1.58     m €  (1.60    m €)       
Switzerland  1996 / 2003  0.69     m €  (0.70    m €)        
United Kingdom  1992 / 2003  36.92   m €  (37.50  m €)        
USA  1992 / 2003  196.02 m €  (199.1  m €)      
 
 
These monetary amounts were collected in “the sunshine project”. The report by Hunger 
(2005) presents an overview of data submitted by state parties to the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) in the course of the annual information exchange, the so-called 
Confidence Building Measures.  
 
It is striking that, for example, the expenditure of the USA on its biodefence programme is 
approximately as high as the amount spent by the European Union for protection against 
radiological threats
109. The costs expended by the Japanese government for biodefence 
programmes are amazingly low compared with other industrial nations. 
 
                                                 
108  Hunger (2005) 
109  Royal Society (2008) 62 
Appendix C: The Bhopal accident 
 
In 1984, one of the biggest chemical accidents occurred in Bhopal, India. In the early hours 
the December 3rd, forty tons of methyl isocyanine leaked from an industrial plant, due to a 
technical failure. 3,000-8,000 people died directly and approximately 20,000 died in the 
aftermath of this accident. Nearly 150,000 people are suffering from long-term effects of the 
accident. 
Table 19: The Bhopal accident and the economic impact 
Recovery, reconstruction, restoration  
 





Payments by the Indian Government in 1985 
for food assistance and cash grants to families 




Indirect damage costs   Claimed costs by Indian Government: 500 
USD (398.22 €) per person suffering from 
long-term effects of the accident. 2,000 USD 
(1592.86 €)1.40x10
-08 per family which lost 
one of their members in the accident 
113 
Union Carbide Corporation share price 
dropped from 60 to 30 USD  (56.92 € to 
28.46 €) in the period immediately after the 
accident 
114 
Litigation costs: claims amounting to 3 
billion USD (3.81b €) 6.33x10
-02115  
 
Table 20: The Bhopal accident - dead and injured people 
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In his paper, Hopkins examines the question whether the often-used term by government 
agencies that “safety pays” is really effective in the case of catastrophic hazards. Among his 
examples of historic catastrophic incidents, he looks at the Bhopal accident and the economic 
consequences for the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC
121). He concludes that in the 
aftermath of the Bhopal accident, the UCC benefited because of aggressive restructuring of 
the company and the company’s new focus on its core business. All these activities made the 
company more profitable than ever. 
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Appendix D: The Chernobyl accident 
 
In 1986, one of the worst radiological accidents occurred in Chernobyl, USSR, today’s 
Ukraine. Due to a meltdown and explosion in a nuclear power plant, an extensive area around 
the plant was highly contaminated with radioactive material. Thousands of people had to be 
evacuated. The aftermath of the radioactive contamination was traceable in several European 
countries.   
 
 





Cleaning activities, decontamination and building of the sarcophagus as 
well as over 20,000 new houses and 15,000 flats in the Ukraine: 17 




Direct costs in farming, milk industry and for measurement equipment in 
slaughter houses: 4.9m USD (6.01m €) 9.6x10
-05123  
 
Total costs of mitigating all Chernobyl related damages in Norway: ~ 





Macroeconomic loss of Belarus, 1986 up to 2015: 235b USD  
(288.23b €) 4.6 
119 
 




The Norwegian government spends 3m $US (3.68m €) 5.88x10
-05 per 
year on measuring radioactivity in meat 
119   
 
The German government spent 300 m $US (296.77 m €) 3.3x10
-02 as a 
concession to losses by the cattle breeding, agricultural and horticultural 
industries. A further 44 m $US (43.53 m €) 4.81x10
-02 were spent on the 
processing of contaminated milk. 
119  
 




Inspection and monitoring of sheep in Wales related to radioactive 







Costs of closure of Chernobyl-type nuclear power plants: 1 – 16 billion 
USD  
(1.01b – 16.31b €) 1.35x10
-02 – 2.16x10
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Table 22: The Chernobyl accident - dead and injured people 
People killed immediately after the accident  47 
127  
Expected cases of thyroid cancer  18,000 – 66,000 
124  
Thyroid cancer cases  > 4,000 
124  
Expected cases of cancer deaths  30,000 – 60,000 
124  










Both catastrophes (Chernobyl and Bhopal) were accidents, but they could have been caused 
by a terror act. For this reason the consequences, especially the economic effects of 
reconstruction, rebuilding and restoration, would have been the same.  
 
It is striking that there is a large range, even when it comes to the results in the two studies 
that treat the effects of Bhopal and Chernobyl. Here it may be said that very concrete values 
were able to be determined as long as the purely monetary costs, which resulted from the 
events, were concerned. However, only individual areas were examined. In contrast, the data 
fluctuated considerably in both cases with regard to the number of dead or injured. Thus the 
data on the number of victims in Bhopal ranged from 2,500 to 17,500, and in the case of the 
Chernobyl disaster the data on the number of victims subsequently afflicted with or who died 
from cancer ranged from 1,200 to 75,000. 
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